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Abstract: This article reviews the policy positions of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania with respect to the Ukraine crisis – the biggest foreign policy 
challenge for the Baltic states since they regained independence. Ukraine 
dominated the Baltic foreign policy agenda from the outbreak of the crisis, 
because it touched upon a dimension of existential threat for the Baltic 
countries. While giving an overview of the main policy domains where the 
effect of the Ukraine crisis could be observed, this article demonstrates that the 
three Baltic countries adopted a comprehensive approach to security and 
foreign policymaking, underlining cooperation both at a national and European 
level. In light of this, the Ukraine crisis can be seen as a maturity test for post-
independence Baltic foreign policy. 
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Introduction 
The outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine at the end of November 2013, which 
led to the annexation of Crimea and military conflict in Donbas, caused 
disarray and marked a radical change not only in Ukraine but on the 
international scene in Europe and beyond. These events resonated 
particularly strongly in the countries sharing geographical and historical 
proximity to Ukraine and Russia, and these countries were especially 
alarmed by Russia’s aggression. According to some analysts, the three 
Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – were considered “the most 
likely next potential victims of Russian intervention” (Giles, 2016:47). Given 
the environment of political and physical instability that emerged in 
Europe in its wake, the Ukraine crisis could be seen as the biggest foreign 
policy challenge for the Baltic states since regaining independence. 
Therefore, this article aims to provide a general, yet comprehensive, 
overview of the Baltic states’ reactions to the Ukraine crisis. It shows that, 
despite assurances received from international partners – especially from 
NATO Allies – the Baltic states made sure that they had done everything in 
their power to sustain international support in this security situation. By 
maintaining a vigilant foreign policy, the Baltic countries mobilized all of 
their policy experience from the past 25 years in order to reinforce their 
international position against a potential threat from Russia. 
As will be outlined below, the Baltic states reacted quickly to the 
Ukraine crisis and not only pursued strong domestic and foreign policies 
encompassing various policy domains, but they also made extensive use of 
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the European Union (EU) policy framework and NATO collective defense 
guarantees. They came to view the EU as a key platform for pursuing 
relations with Russia. They also came to favor the common European 
response to Russia, as illustrated by the adoption and continuous extension 
of sanctions and EU foreign policy discussions. At the same time, all three 
countries observed with concern the rapprochement of Russia and the West 
in the case of Syria and in the fight against the Islamic State. Despite the 
repercussions of international terrorism and the migration crisis that 
culminated in Europe in 2015-2016, the Baltic states, along with like-
minded countries, successfully managed to keep Ukraine high up on the EU 
agenda. 
The article begins by explaining the role and relevance of the Eastern 
European dimension in Baltic foreign policy prior to the outbreak of the 
crisis in Ukraine—these serve as a basis for understanding the following 
sections on Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian reactions to the events in 
Ukraine. More specifically, the article outlines the main domestic and 
foreign policy messages communicated in and by the Baltic states shortly 
after the crisis began; it then goes on to review the main policy domains 
that received heightened attention at the time. These domains include 
domestic politics, the issue of Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and 
Latvia, the effects of Russia’s disinformation campaign, the economy 
(including the effect of sanctions), and military security. Finally, the article 
offers some suggestions regarding the evolution of the relationship 
between the Baltic states and the EU during the Ukraine crisis. It argues 
that the crisis increased the European dimension in Baltic foreign policy, 
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which, in turn, may pave the way for a more Europeanized national foreign 
policy. 
 
Eastern Europe in Baltic foreign policy before the crisis 
Integration with the West has been the main foreign policy goal of the 
Baltic states since the restoration of independence in the beginning of 
1990s. With the accession to the EU and NATO in 2004, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania took a significant step towards achieving this aim, and full-scale 
involvement in international fora gave a new perspective to Baltic policy-
makers. When immediate security was perceived as guaranteed through 
NATO and the EU, the focus of national foreign policy was expanded: it 
now centered on the EU’s Eastern neighborhood and Eastern Partnership 
initiative1 (Galbreath et al, 2008; Jakniūnaitė, 2009; Kesa, 2011). The 
motivation for this was two-fold. First, with their transition experiences 
fresh in mind, the Baltic states argued that, among EU countries, they had 
special expertise both in supporting other post-Soviet countries with the 
tearing down of the remnants of the Soviet legacy in their political and 
economic systems, and in offering these states assistance with achieving 
full democracy and market economy. The Baltic transformation was 
perceived as an undeniable success story, wherein the former targets of 
democracy promotion and beneficiaries of development aid became the 
advocates and donors for those countries next in line. Second, this enabled 
the Baltic states to edge closer to EU decision-making processes and to 
																																								 																				
1 Eastern Partnership (established in 2009) is an EU policy aimed at engaging with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. 
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influence the EU’s relations with its neighborhood – including Russia – in 
correspondence with their interests. 
In the years before the Ukraine crisis, the Eastern Partnership 
maintained its lead position in the foreign policy of the Baltic states 
(Kasekamp, 2013; Vilpišauskas, 2013). For example, all six countries were 
considered to be development cooperation priorities (with particular focus 
on Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine), and the Eastern Partnership was one of 
the key issues for the Lithuanian and Latvian EU Presidencies in the second 
half of 2013 and first half of 2015, respectively. The Baltic states supported 
giving Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine a long-term prospective path to  EU 
membership, while also  fully realizing the enlargement fatigue, economic 
crisis, and other more pressing issues prevailing in the EU. 
Regarding another central dimension of Baltic foreign policy after EU 
and NATO accession (i.e., Russia), there were few signs of progress for 
various reasons, despite some attempts at normalizing relations. Bilateral 
trade relations with Russia may have been on the rise for most of the 
2000s, but past legacies and mutual distrust, combined with Russia’s 
resistance to the Baltic states’ EU and NATO accession on the one hand, 
and Baltic observations about domestic political developments in Russia on 
the other hand, loomed over the relations. Antagonistic historical truths 
about World War II were amplified by Russia’s renewed compatriot policy 
and the Bronze Soldier crisis in Estonia (see Berg & Ehin, 2009). As well, 
concerns regarding the insufficiently integrated Russian-speaking 
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minorities in Estonia and Latvia2 shaped both the (lack of) contact between 
interethnic groups in these countries and Baltic-Russian bilateral relations.  
The broader security dilemmas in the Baltic region were augmented 
rather than diminished with EU and NATO enlargement (Lašas & Galbreath, 
2013). For example, despite extensive EU-facilitated cross-border 
cooperation, border issues on the political level took a long time to move 
forward. Of the three countries, only Lithuania had a ratified border with 
Russia (completed in 1992) before EU accession. The Latvian-Russian 
border treaty was finalized in 2007, whereas Estonia and Russia signed the 
treaty in 2014 and have kept it shelved since. NATO did not bring 
immediate changes on the ground in the Baltic region; for example, there 
was no detailed NATO regional defense plan until the beginning of the 
Ukraine crisis, despite constant Baltic pressure. The temporary 
rapprochement in US-Russia relations that resulted from Obama’s reset 
policy made the Baltic states anxious. From their perspective, joint defense 
projects between NATO and Russia were “naïve and misguided” (Lašas & 
Galbreath, 2013:155).  
With this legacy of national experience, the Baltic states struggled to 
influence EU’s Russia policy, as some EU institutions and member states 
saw the Baltic states as “unhealthily focused” on Russia (Kuus 2011: 279). 
Ever since the Bronze Soldier crisis and subsequent cyberattacks in Estonia 
(2007), the Russian-Georgian War (2008), various trade disputes between 
Russia and the Baltic states (food exports, energy), and Russian-Ukrainian 
gas disputes (e.g. 2006, 2009, 2014), the political efforts of the Baltic states 
																																								 																				
2 See the section on Russian-speaking minorities below. 
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mainly focused on maintaining relations with Russia on a very pragmatic 
level. 
 
The Baltic states and the crisis in Ukraine 
The Baltic states perceived the events of the Ukraine crisis as a 
confirmation of their previous foreign policy choices regarding Russia. 
Baltic decisionmakers felt that they had been signaling to the EU – and the 
entire West, for that matter – to be more cautious regarding the 
developments in its Eastern neighborhood for a long time, or at least since 
the war in Georgia in 2008. Ukraine was a “wake up call” for Europe, while 
the Baltic states had “said so” all along. It was the wider international 
community that had “kept pressing the snooze button... to postpone 
awakening” (Ilves, 2014a). The annexation of Crimea, subsequent military 
conflict,t and the inability of the West to influence the situation came as a 
shock to many in Europe and realized the worst fears of Baltic 
decisionmakers. The Ukraine crisis was seen as a collapse of the European 
security system: a war, in which Russia sought to “redraw the post-[WWII] 
war map of Europe” (Dalia Grybauskaitė, in Easton, 2014). This was 
reflected in the statements of many Baltic political figures. Toomas Hendrik 
Ilves, President of Estonia at the time, saw the Ukraine crisis as a “conflict 
of values” and a “battle between Europe and non-Europe” (Ilves, 2014b). 
Dalia Grybauskaitė, President of Lithuania and one of the staunchest critics 
of Russia, caused strong diplomatic and political reactions by calling Russia 
“a terrorist state” (Weymouth, 2014) and warning of a “prelude to [a] ‘New 
Cold War’” (BBC, 2014b). Edgars Rinkēvičs, Foreign Minister of Latvia, 
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referred to Russia as “a revisionist super-power prepared to use military 
force to satisfy its ambitions” (LSM, 2016a), while also referring to its 
actions as “a return to 19[th]-century politics” (Gotev, 2015). 
The Baltic states have continued to be outspoken supporters of 
Ukrainian sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. They refused 
to recognize the results of the contentious referendum and the subsequent 
annexation of Crimea, insisting on the violation of the principles of 
international law. The Baltic reactions did not stay at the rhetorical level 
and were observable in various dimensions. At the outbreak of the crisis, 
the political support of the Baltic states concentrated on the Ukrainian 
opposition. A number of high-ranking officials visited Kyiv at the time of 
the protests, and the Baltic states officially recognized the new government 
led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Baltic assistance to Ukraine included providing 
financial aid, project support, expertise on conducting reforms, and 
government-provided humanitarian aid; this was complemented by strong 
engagement from civil society organizations in all three countries, and 
especially in Lithuania. A number of rallies and protests against Russia’s 
actions took place in Vilnius. Lithuania was also the only one out of the 
three countries to agree to send military aid to Ukraine. 
At the same time, genuine Baltic support for Ukraine must be seen in 
the context of their own security. The fact that analogous arguments used 
by Russia during the annexation of Crimea could also be applied to the 
Baltic states, coupled with Russia’s readiness to use military force while 
blurring the boundaries of international law, made the threat appear more 
realistic than ever. As summed up by the security policy adviser to the 
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President of Estonia, “the scope of the crisis extends beyond Ukraine to the 
security of the Baltic region itself” (Maigre, 2015:17). Thus, in addition to 
the fact that Ukraine was a foreign policy priority, the crisis had an 
existential dimension for the Baltic states. Since many policy positions of 
the Baltic states overlapped, they will be considered here in bulk, with 
attention to differences in individual approaches. Unsurprisingly, security 
emerged as a very strong trend in the official discourses of Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania. Taking into account the fact that the Baltic interpretation of 
national security is broad and comprehensive, the analysis below will focus 
on a select number of soft and hard security aspects. In what follows, the 
main Baltic political discourses pertaining to the Ukraine crisis and Russia, 
both at the domestic and international level, will be discussed: Russian-
speaking minorities in the Baltic region, Russian disinformation campaigns, 
the effect of sanctions (both the EU and Russian counter-sanctions), and 
military security. The dimensions have been chosen because they have 
often been considered as vulnerabilities in the case of a potential threat to 
the Baltic region. 
Foreign and domestic policy discourses 
Upon the outbreak of the crisis, the Baltic countries mobilized in 
support of Ukraine, as is evident from the fact that Ukraine clearly emerged 
as the single most prevalent topic in both the bi- and multilateral foreign 
relations of all three states. The Ukraine crisis could be considered the 
biggest foreign policy challenge for the Baltic states since regaining 
independence: it put to test all previous policy choices, from EU and NATO 
accession to a cautious Russia-policy, and from participation at 
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international military operations and peacekeeping missions to domestic 
social and economic policies. 
The events in Ukraine overshadowed the Baltic states’ national 
foreign policy priority of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) both on the EU and 
national level. The failure of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in 
November 2013 – where the then President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych 
withdrew from signing the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU, 
contrary to domestic and European expectations – was a clear 
disappointment to the Baltic states. This was also revealed by their critique 
of the policy, which called for the EU to be “more strategic, resolute and 
united with regard to the Eastern Partnership” (MFA of Lithuania, 2013), as 
well as for the modernization of the EaP (ERR, 2013; MFA of Latvia, 2014a). 
As most of the limited EU attention was directed at Ukraine, the Baltic 
states understood the need to uphold close contacts with other EaP 
countries, as well. The Latvian Presidency, for which EaP was also a 
Presidency priority, made efforts to keep Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus 
engaged with the EU in light of the Association Agreements with Georgia 
and Moldova. In the face of the Riga summit in May 2015 and concurring 
events in the EU and Ukraine, the future of the EaP was already appearing 
bleak. Even the Latvian presidency saw this as “a survival summit” (Gotev, 
2015), posing a question of “to be or not to be” for the policy in the future 
(MFA of Latvia, 2015).  
Two very clear and contradictory messages could be distinguished 
in the official Baltic discourses regarding their own countries. First and 
foremost, all three governments kept reassuring their domestic audiences 
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on the topic of national security, insisting that what happened in Ukraine 
could not happen in the Baltic states due to the latter’s NATO and EU 
membership. For example, President Ilves of Estonia dismissed in a 
straightforward manner the possibility that Russia’s actions in Ukraine 
could be repeated in the Baltic region, saying such actions would be “a very 
foolish thing [for Russia] to do” (The Guardian, 2014a). However, in reality, 
there were grave concerns among the Baltic politicians about the threat of 
a potential military confrontation. This leads to the second message: while 
domestic audiences were being convinced of NATO security guarantees, the 
policymakers started to pressure (openly, as well as behind closed doors) 
the Allies for increased military presence in the Baltic states. Above all, this 
was aimed at the United States as a strategic partner. For example, Estonia 
announced that security issues were most important in Estonia’s relations 
with the US (MFA of Estonia, 2014); Latvia emphasized the strong Euro-
Atlantic orientation and “harmonizing the security and defense interests of 
the EU and NATO” (MFA of Latvia, 2014c; 2014d); while Lithuania’s 
President explicitly urged NATO to deploy troops in the Baltic region, to 
avoid repeating a “Crimea-style scenario” in Lithuania (The Moscow Times, 
2014). In response to this, President Obama’s visit to Tallinn in the 
beginning of September 2014 was a visible reassurance from the US that 
paved the way for intense negotiations between Baltic and US officials 
regarding defense cooperation. 
At the same time, while the Baltic publics were putting pressure on 
NATO, several incidents directly involving Russia took place, further 
exacerbating the uneasiness of the situation. Shortly after Obama’s visit to 
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Tallinn, Estonian Internal Security Service (KaPo) officer Eston Kohver was 
detained by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) on the Estonian-
Russian border and was later sentenced to 15 years in prison for espionage 
and related charges. Although the Estonian state institutions handled the 
case professionally and Kohver was later traded for former KaPo officer 
Aleksei Dressen, convicted of espionage in Estonia, it took a year until 
Kohver was released, during which the incident caught widespread 
domestic and international attention. This was not an isolated incident: in a 
spy scandal in Lithuania in May 2015, Russian citizen Nikolai Filipchenko 
was detained and sentenced to 10 years in prison (Delfi, 2017). On a more 
bizarre note, Russia caught some attention in the media by opening two 
Baltic-related cases for legal review. One concerned the Soviet recognition 
of the Baltic states’ independence in 1991—a case initiated by the 
Prosecutor General’s Office (which had previously ruled the transfer of 
Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 illegal) due to the alleged argument that the 
decision may have been illegal (BBC, 2015). Another case concerned 
reopening investigations against Lithuanian conscripts who had refused to 
serve in the Soviet army after Lithuania had declared independence in 
1990; these conscripts were therefore now facing criminal charges from 
Russia (Delfi, 2014). As was aptly summarized by Marko Mihkelson, the 
chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Estonian Parliament at 
the time, the Baltic states “…have been dealing with difficult issues with 
Russia for years” (The Guardian, 2014b), implying that there was nothing 
new about the incidents. 
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Overall political support to Baltic governments remained high in the 
context of heightened economic and security concerns. Due to events in 
Ukraine, the trend of downplaying the domestic impact other international 
issues of – such as the European debt crisis or the influx of refugees to the 
EU – was observable, especially during the election periods. This, in turn, 
can provide an explanation for the sharp reactions of Baltic publics to the 
refugee quotas proposed on the EU level: the concerns about existing and 
potential new minorities – as well as their prospects for integration – were 
already amplified. In the case of Estonia, there was a general consensus 
among the public, as well as among the majority of political parties, 
regarding Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and the debate therefore focused 
more on the possible courses of action rather than on the threat 
perception. However, there were significant gaps between the levels of 
support from Estonian- and Russian-speakers for political parties. This led 
Keskerakond – the main opposition party at the time, which has also often 
been considered pro-Russian – to collect the votes of Russian-speakers and 
thereby lose votes from the Estonian-speaking population. In the Latvian 
parliamentary elections of 2014, security concerns were more central, since 
the opposition party Harmony, enjoying the biggest support from ethnic 
Russians, openly refused to condemn the annexation of Crimea (The 
Guardian, 2014c). In 2015, Raimonds Vējonis, a vehement NATO supporter 
and a critic of Russia, was elected President of Latvia. However, despite 
strong criticism towards Russia regarding its actions in Ukraine, Latvia 
followed quite a pragmatic foreign policy, prompted by extensive business 
ties and economic dependence between Latvia and Russia (Potjomkina & 
Vizgunova, 2014). In Lithuania, it was resolute rhetoric towards Russia and 
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messages focused on national security that played a significant part in the 
campaign that brought Grybauskaitė – dubbed the “Iron Lady” – her 
second term in office (BBC, 2014a). In the local elections in Lithuania in 
2015, changes in the political landscape, such as the local Polish minority 
party with pro-Kremlin reputation joining forces with the ethnic Russian 
representatives and gaining new mandates in several municipalities 
(Tracevskis, 2015), were seen as preparation for the parliamentary elections 
of 2016. 
Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic region 
After the “little green men scenario” in Eastern Ukraine and the 
annexation of Crimea, it became rather common in the West to ask if Narva 
or Latgale – i.e., the overwhelmingly Russian-populated areas in Estonia 
and Latvia – could be next in line. Concerns about Russian-speaking 
populations in the three countries3 were grave because, resorting to 
oversimplification, Russia’s arguments for its presence in Ukraine included 
defending the rights of Russian-speakers abroad and responding to 
favorable public opinion regarding closer ties to Russia among the local 
population—all of which were also seen as potentially applicable in the 
Baltic cases. Russia’s policies regarding its Baltic diaspora have strained 
bilateral relations ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the issue 
was increasingly politicized after the Baltic states gained EU membership. 
Russia has since referred to human rights violations due to the large 
																																								 																				
3 The number of ethnic Russians in Estonia is approx. 24.8% of the population, in Latvia approx. 
26.2% and in Lithuania approx. 5.8%, however, other minorities increase the number of Russian-
speakers to roughly 30% of the population in Estonia, 42% in Latvia, and about 12% in Lithuania 
(Estonian Population and Housing Census, 2011; McGuinness, 2014; Lithuanian Population and 
Housing Census, 2011). 
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number of Russian-speaking non-citizens in Estonia and Latvia, the refusal 
of the two countries to recognize Russian as an official language, and the 
reduction of the number of Russian schools. Estonia and Latvia, on the 
other hand, have emphasized the opportunities to obtain citizenship via 
naturalization and the necessity of learning the official language in order 
to adapt to the society in general.4 
Although a lengthier analysis is not possible in the framework of 
this article, it must be pointed out that, while the spectrum of attitudes 
among Baltic Russian-speakers was wide5, there was reason for concern, 
since the majority often lived in separate communities and continued to 
receive information through Russian TV channels—meaning, their 
worldview was being shaped by official Russian discourses. The Russian 
compatriot policy was designed for Baltic Russian-speakers to maintain 
close ties with the Motherland via various cultural and political means, and 
this, in turn, inevitably undermined the Baltic governments’ progress in 
facilitating the building of social cohesion. At the same time, the majority 
of Baltic Russian-speakers in all three countries held, in general, favorable 
attitudes towards their respective countries of residence and its state 
institutions. Despite the shortcomings in the ethnic integration process, the 
Crimea scenario was considered unlikely in the case of the Baltic region, 
																																								 																				
4 The multi-faceted issue of Russian-speaking minorities has been analyzed extensively, with 
ample data available. See, for example, the Monitoring of Integration in Estonian Society and 
other analyses at the Institute of Baltic Studies’ website: 
https://www.ibs.ee/en/publications/social-cohesion/; and analyses on the Latvian Centre for 
Human Rights’ website: http://cilvektiesibas.org.lv/en/social-integration/. 
5 In the analysis of Monitoring of Integration in Estonian Society (2011), different groups of 
Russian-speakers are identified, based on their likelihood of level of integration into the 
Estonian society: successfully integrated, Russian speaking patriot of Estonia, Estonian-speaking 
active and critical, Little integrated, Unintegrated passive. 
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not only because of NATO membership, but also because of higher living 
standards, social security, and other advantages (including travel and 
employment opportunities) stemming from EU member-state status 
(Kasekamp, 2016). As attention to the level of integration of Russian-
speakers resurfaced (not least due to the Russian disinformation campaign), 
Baltic politicians mainly sought to address some of the concerns with 
several short- and long-term measures ranging from providing more 
language courses to creating alternative channels of information, as will be 
discussed below. 
Russian disinformation campaign 
The disinformation campaign launched by Russia during the Ukraine 
crisis in Europe was the largest since Soviet times. The campaign had many 
targets, including general publics in the West, like-minded (anti-systemic) 
groups all over the world, Russian domestic audiences, and the (Russian-
speaking) communities in Russia’s “near abroad” (Wilson, 2015). There were 
a number of Russian media platforms such as internet portals, TV stations 
(PBK, RTR, NTV Mir, etc.), print media outlets, etc., available in the Baltic 
states. Aside from TV channels, the new Russian media outlet Sputnik – an 
online news platform and radio station in more than 30 languages, 
including many official EU languages – also opened its website in Latvian 
(first in 2014, later shut down and reopened), in Lithuanian (2015) and in 
Estonian (2016). Russian-speaking minorities and other groups located 
solely in the Russian information space in the Baltic region were therefore 
a direct target group for the campaign. In the early phases of the Ukraine 
conflict, Baltic governments were already seeking to adopt several 
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countermeasures to this campaign, on both the national and the EU level. 
Latvia and Lithuania opted for legal measures such as fining and/or 
banning Russian media providers for short periods, having accused them of 
“inciting hatred”. This led to the shutdown of Sputnik by the Latvian 
authorities in March 2016, after an investigation established a "clear link" 
between Sputnik and Dmitry Kiselev, the Director of Russia’s RT media 
empire who was facing targeted EU sanctions after Russia's illegal 
annexation of Crimea. Although the issue was considered controversial, 
Latvian Foreign Minister Rinkēvičs called upon other EU member-states to 
follow suit (LSM, 2016b). Estonia chose not to ban the Russian media: 
instead, as a more substantial move, a Russian-language TV channel was 
launched in September 2015, in an attempt to engage the local Russian-
speaking community and provide an “adequate picture of Estonian society” 
(ERR, 2015). The decision was disputed, since the channel had to compete 
with already existing media platforms while having a very limited budget. 
According to public surveys, however, the channel managed to establish 
itself with permanent viewership, albeit small6.  
The Baltic states also took initiative on the EU level. Estonia and 
Lithuania belonged to a four-member group (along with Denmark and the 
UK) that sent a non-paper to EU High Representative/ Vice President 
Federica Mogherini in January 2015, lobbying for an EU response to the 
Russian disinformation campaign. The undersigned called for a response 
consisting of four aspects: raising public awareness about disinformation 
and the proper response to it (e.g., by establishing a web platform for 
																																								 																				
6 The channel had a steady daily share at 0.5% in spring 2016 which amounts to approx. 
200,000 viewers per week, more than half of these were Estonian-speakers (TNS Emor, 2016). 
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deconstructing disinformation); taking an assertive or proactive approach 
to increasing EU visibility both by preparing a strategic communication 
Action Plan and providing alternative sources of information to Russian-
speakers, and by supporting independent international and national media 
platforms in Russian language; ensuring accountability among media 
providers regarding any violations of rules of broadcasting and public 
information in the EU (EU Strategic Communication…, 2015). As a result, 
the East StratCom Task Force7 was established in April 2015 under the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) and was composed of nine 
representatives from various member states, including, among others, an 
Estonian and a Latvian. The central functions of the Task Force were to 
explain EU policies to the audiences in EaP countries by communicating 
key policy areas, providing ad hoc information about topical issues, myth-
busting, and supporting the EU in strengthening the media in its Eastern 
neighborhood. Although the Baltic states lobbied for a cross-European TV 
channel, there was not enough political interest and will among the 
member states to pursue this (LSM, 2015). In another initiative, Latvia 
pressured for a stronger European stance by leading the review of the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) during its EU Presidency. In 
the autumn of 2015, Latvia disseminated a “green card” proposal for the 
revision of the directive regarding the regulation of hate speech, with the 
aim of checking Russian media channels registered in other EU countries 
but broadcasting in the Baltic states. It argued that the EU is “increasingly 
witnessing a worrying trend of mass media becoming a powerful tool for 
spreading hate speech, intolerance and propaganda,” and this should not 
																																								 																				
7 For more information on the Task Force, see EEAS website: http://bit.ly/1Snzome  
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be disregarded during the review process (Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, 
2015a). The debates on this have continued into 2017. 
Baltic economies during the first years of sanctions 
The EU first imposed economic sanctions against Russia in July 
2014, targeting sectoral cooperation and exchanges with Russia. The Baltic 
economies were affected both by EU sanctions aimed at Russia and Russian 
counter sanctions on Baltic meat, dairy, and vegetable products, although 
more precise impact has remained debatable. Despite the effect of 
sanctions on these economies, which were demonstrating slow economic 
growth anyway, all Baltic states strongly favored EU sanctions against 
Russia, as well as their repeated extensions until the Minsk agreements 
would be fully enforced.  Politicians in all three countries generally 
supported sanctions against Russia, with more vocal exceptions from 
Latvia. For example, the leader of pro-Russian Harmony called the attempt 
to use trade sanctions against Russia to stop the aggression in Ukraine a 
“nightmarish idea” (LSM, 2014), and Andris Bērziņš, President of Latvia at 
the time, stressed the need for a more pragmatic approach that would 
maintain balanced and neighborly ties (Eglitis & Langley, 2015). Public 
opinion in the Baltic states was supportive of sanctions, and the sanctions’ 
effects – as far as there were any on the level of everyday life – were 
considered an inevitability. 
At the time the sanctions were passed, the main trading partners of 
the Baltic states were their closest neighbors, with more trade moving in 
the EU direction than in the Russian direction (Zvaigzne, 2015). However, 
Baltic businesses with markets in Russia struggled, as reorientation to new 
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markets was complicated, especially given the economic situation and the 
absence of compensations for the sanctions’ effects. As the Baltic states 
had suffered from Russia’s import bans on several occasions before the 
crisis in Ukraine, some businesses had already adapted their markets and 
moved away from Russia, in search of new and more predictable trading 
partners. Nevertheless, compared with other EU member-states, the Baltic 
states were clearly harder hit by the Russian sanctions; the direct effect on 
the export of goods varied in 2013 from 2.6% of GDP in Lithuania, 0.4% in 
Estonia, and 0.3% in Latvia (Oja, 2015). Of the three countries, Lithuania 
suffered most from the sanctions. While 21.6% of all Lithuanian exports 
went to Russia (the second biggest export partner) in 2014, the share had 
fallen to 13.7% in 2015 and 13.5% in 2016, even though Russia remained 
their biggest export partner (Statistics Lithuania, 2017). For Latvia, Russia 
remained the third biggest export partner, despite significant decrease due 
to the sanctions: total exports were at 10.71% in 2014, 8.07% in 2015, and 
7.62% in 2016 (Statistics Latvia, 2017). In the case of Estonia in 2014, 
Russia was the 4th biggest trading partner with 10% of all exports; by 2015, 
Russia’s share in foreign trade exports had fallen to 7% and maintained this 
position in 2016 (Statistics Estonia, 2017). At the same time, it must be 
emphasized that the Baltic export of agricultural products to Russia 
dropped not only due to the sanctions but also as a result of the decrease 
of exports not covered by the embargo, which were the result of unstable 
market conditions, the decrease of demand in Russia due to low value of 
the ruble, and the economic crisis (Szczepanski, 2015:7). 
Military security and defense cooperation 
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Compared to the areas discussed above, as well as to the situation 
before the Ukraine crisis, changes in terms of military security in the Baltic 
states were the most explicit. In a clear response to Russia’s actions in 
Crimea, as well as its military build-up and provocations in the Baltic Sea 
region, the defense expenses in the Baltic regoin skyrocketed, NATO 
military presence increased, bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation 
soared, and numerous local and regional military exercises and trainings 
were carried out. All three capitals were established as hosts of a NATO 
Centre of Excellence (COE) – Cooperative Cyber Defence COE in Tallinn 
(established in 2008), Strategic Communication COE in Riga (2015), and 
NATO Energy Security COE in Vilnius (2012). 
Before the Ukraine crisis, Estonia was the only Baltic country and 
one of only four NATO members (along with the US, the UK and Greece) to 
meet the NATO defense spending requirement of 2% of GDP for member 
states. In 2016, the Estonian defense budget already exceeded the 
threshold, reaching 2.07% (MOD of Estonia, 2015c). As a result of the 
Ukraine crisis, Latvia and Lithuania also set out to achieve the 2% 
threshold. Latvia started from as low as 0.90% of GDP in 2012, and the 
budget was increased significantly to 1.02% (2015) and 1.41% (2016) 
(Sargs.lv, 2016). Lithuania’s budget was at 0.77% (2013), but a sharp 
increase to 1.15% (2015) and 1.48% (2016) of GDP was subsequently 
achieved (Delfi, 2015). The largest share of defense expenses was spent on 
the development of capabilities and special projects. 
In addition to increasing the defense budget, Lithuania also 
reinstated conscription (abolished in 2008), leaving Latvia as the only one 
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of the three Baltic states with professional armed forces. All three countries 
reformed both their military structures and legislation. In Estonia, a new 
National Defense Act was adopted (enforced on 1 January 2016), wherein 
peace- and wartime defense regulations, as well as international military 
co-operation, were merged into one, to specify and facilitate 
decisionmaking processes, organize mobilization, and reserve service (Riigi 
Teataja, 2016). Lithuania conducted several reforms regarding the structure 
of their intelligence and counter-intelligence systems (Lithuanian State 
Security Department, 2015). Along with Poland and Ukraine, Lithuania 
signed an agreement to launch a joint brigade, LITPOLUKRBRIG. Latvia 
adopted a new Law on National Security that requires the President to 
request help from NATO in case of a military attack (Sargs.lv, 2014). The 
new National Security Concept, adopted in 2015, outlined priorities in eight 
threat areas and analyzed the changed international security environment 
as a result of the crisis in Ukraine (Saeima of the Republic of Latvia 2015b).  
Increased Russian maritime and airspace activity in the Baltic Sea 
region, as well as recurring violations of Baltic airspace, led to an increase 
in NATO air policing missions (although later cut) and the creation of a 
second Baltic air base (in addition to Šiauliai, Lithuania) established at 
Ämari, Estonia. Deterrence measures agreed upon at the 2014 NATO Wales 
summit were welcomed by the Baltic states as positive developments. 
However, Baltic governments continued negotiations with Allied states to 
establish permanent troop presence in the former, and, at the NATO 
Warsaw Summit in 2016, the Alliance took on the obligation of deploying 
battalions to all three Baltic countries, as well as Poland. The Baltic states 
ІДЕОЛОГІЯ І ПОЛІТИКА ИДЕОЛОГИЯ И ПОЛИТИКА IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS 
© 2017 Foundation for Good Politics 
ISSN 2227-6068 
 
№ 1(7), 2017                                                                                                                                                                                                        30	
also sought to increase regional cooperation with Nordic countries through 
arrangements such as the Danish-Baltic bilateral defense agreements, 
which focused on joint training and exercises (see, e.g. Embassy of 
Denmark in Estonia 2015). 
According to public opinion surveys conducted at the height of the 
crisis in Ukraine, attention to security rose among the citizens of all three 
Baltic countries. For example, defense willingness among Estonian citizens 
was at a record high in spring 2015 (85%) (MOD of Estonia, 2015a), while 
the same statistic was 41.7% in Latvia in autumn 2015 (SKDS, 2015: 39). 
While no comparable data was found on defense willingness in Lithuania, 
public approval regarding NATO and increasing the defense budget was 
relatively high in 2015 (56% and 47%, respectively) (MOD of Lithuania, 
2016). Similar sentiments were also reflected in the fact that interest in 
joining volunteer defense formations (Kaitseliit in Estonia, Zemessardze in 
Latvia, and KASP in Lithuania) spiked in all three countries. 
Throughout the polls, a sharp gap in perceptions can be observed 
along ethnic lines. For example, in Estonia, 46% of Estonian-speakers and 
11% of non-Estonian (i.e. Russian-) speakers were proud of NATO 
membership in 2015; further, the confidence of Estonians in Defense 
Forces was 91%, compared to 51% of non-Estonians. When it came to 
“Russian activities in restoring its authority”, 7% of non-Estonian speakers 
and 53% of Estonian-speakers saw this as a threat (MOD of Estonia, 2015b). 
In Latvia, 81% of Latvian-speakers and 59% of Russian-speakers expressed 
concern about the military security of Latvia, and 48.5% of Latvian-
speakers and 27.8% of Russian-speakers were willing to defend their 
ІДЕОЛОГІЯ І ПОЛІТИКА ИДЕОЛОГИЯ И ПОЛИТИКА IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS 
© 2017 Foundation for Good Politics 
ISSN 2227-6068 
 
№ 1(7), 2017                                                                                                                                                                                                        31	
country militarily in 2015, while 32.7% could not answer the question at 
all. Russian-speakers’ trust in NATO in 2015 was 23.5%, whereas the figure 
for Latvian-speakers was 59.8%. (SKDS 2015: 44). 
The issues discussed above effectively demonstrate the complex 
interdependence across various policy fields on which the Ukraine crisis 
touched—many of these fields had both a domestic as well as a foreign 
policy dimension. The support of the Baltic public and elites for Ukraine 
was firm and, in most cases, there was little political debate on the matter. 
Russian-speaking minorities and integration challenges in the Baltic region 
returned to the center of attention due to the extensive Russian 
disinformation campaign. Although the effect of economic sanctions on the 
Baltic economies was relatively low, it still influenced businesses, which 
were operating in an environment of slow economic growth. Security and 
defense issues resurfaced sharply and were addressed more intensely than 
ever before. Although bilateral relations with EaP countries could not 
compensate for decreased EU attention to its neighbors, the Ukraine crisis 
also managed to keep Eastern Europe on the agenda. How did these issues 
play out at the European level? In many ways, the Baltic states combined 
domestic- and European-level strategies during the crisis, in search of the 
best policy responses. 
 
Baltic states and the EU: Uploading and complementing preferences 
Looking back at the development of policy positions between the Baltic 
states and the EU since the accession of the former to the latter, the Baltic 
states have been supportive of further EU expansion, of the EU speaking 
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with “one voice”, and, on several occasions, of favoring a community 
approach over a bilateral one (Galbreath et al, 2008:125; Made, 2011:69; 
Kasekamp, 2013:103-105). During the accession process and the early years 
of EU membership, the relationship between the Baltic states and the EU 
was clearly more about downloading EU policies rather than uploading 
their own preferences to the EU level. As all three countries saw NATO as 
the main security provider, the “dilemma of dual loyalty” (Budrytė, 2005) 
influenced their foreign policy, which relied on “hard” security provided by 
the transatlantic cooperation and NATO, as well as relying on the broader 
economic, societal, and even military security (in terms of CSDP) provided 
by EU policies (Galbreath & Lamoreaux, 2013:115). With an active role in 
the Eastern Partnership and other policies, the Baltic states could also 
channel their own foreign policy preferences to the EU and expand their 
foreign policy networks through the platform provided by the EU. It is 
therefore not unusual that the position of the Baltic states with respect to 
the crisis in Ukraine converged with the overall EU policy, but diverged 
from it when it came to the degree of the EU’s response. 
The Baltic states were generally satisfied with the EU’s ability to 
achieve a common position with respect to both Russia and Ukraine, with 
the adoption and extension of targeted sanctions, and the prompt and 
encouraging reaction to finalizing the Association Agreement with Ukraine 
in 2014. However, many politicians in the Baltic states were nevertheless 
disappointed with the EU, claiming that, whatever actions the EU agreed 
on, they came too little and too late. For example, President Ilves of 
Estonia declared that the EU was “sitting and watching” while Russia 
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annexed Crimea, and that the EU blacklist of Russian officials was “a minor 
slap on the wrist” (Pop, 2014). The degree of EU sanctions imposed on 
Russia came to meet the Baltic expectations only in the second and third 
round of adoption (Vilson, 2015). With respect to security and defense, all 
three states clearly based their emphasis not on the Common Security and 
Defense Policy but on transatlantic relations and NATO. This policy choice 
reflected, firstly, an understanding of the limits of the EU when it came to 
hard security. Although the Baltic states favored strengthening EU defense 
capabilities in the field of cyberattacks, hybrid warfare, strategic 
communication, and energy security, the overwhelming consensus was that 
a joint EU army would overlap with NATO and serve only to weaken it in 
the contemporary security situation (Potjomkina, 2015). At the same time, 
this was indicative of the Baltic states privileging relations with the US, 
which all three countries regard as the main security provider in the region. 
In all three countries, the relevance of the EU as a platform for 
interactions with and about Ukraine increased in comparison to the time 
before the crisis. It is interesting to examine these tendencies further and 
discuss their potential significance. The EU foreign policy strategy towards 
Ukraine was utilized considerably in national foreign policymaking. At the 
same time, a strong, bilateral, Baltic foreign policy existed side by side with 
the EU’s policy. When comparing the three countries’ use of the EU 
platform and policy in their national foreign policymaking, the country 
whose positions were most in line with the EU was Latvia. On the one 
hand, officials and decisionmakers of Latvia advocated stronger EU 
engagement in the transformation of Ukraine and in relations with Russia 
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(MFA of Latvia, 2014b); on the other hand, Latvian officials also sought to 
maintain pragmatic cooperation with Russia. Despite the fact that the 
Russian threat was discernibly felt in all three countries, Latvia’s deep ties 
to Russia led to this threat being less vocalized in the former’s foreign 
policy discourse (Bērziņa, 2015). The EU’s foreign policy thus aligned well 
with Latvian preferences. While the EU was an important foreign policy 
platform also for both Estonia and Lithuania, the former placed a slightly 
stronger and more resolute emphasis on the security issues and, therefore, 
on bilateral relations with the US. Lithuania, which held the EU Presidency 
right before the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, demonstrated its recently 
mastered negotiation and lobbying skills in EU structures, while 
simultaneously burning a lot of credit earned during the Presidency in 
order to push for a stronger EU response regarding Ukraine (Vilson, 2015). 
Additionally, Lithuania made extensive use of other multilateral platforms 
to further its policy preferences, as it was a member of the UN Security 
Council and very active in the OSCE and the Council of Europe at the time. 
With the combination of various bi- and multilateral foreign policy avenues 
and an outspoken President, Lithuania clearly emerged as a leader among 
the Baltic states both in and outside the EU. Perhaps the biggest struggles 
for the Baltic states during the second and third year of the crisis focused 
more on keeping Ukraine high on the EU agenda, in light of international 
terrorism and the refugee crisis, which both somewhat began to 
overshadow the recent Russian aggression. The Baltic states continued to 
advocate for greater EU engagement in the Eastern neighborhood, 
including an ambitious neighborhood policy and further EU enlargement.  
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As regards policy towards Russia, the Baltic states remained among 
the more critical and cautious member-states in the EU during the second 
and third year of the Ukraine crisis. The development of the confrontation 
in Ukraine solidified a long-term crisis in Baltic-Russian relations. The 
political dialogue with Russia focused only on very pragmatic issues, such 
as cross-border cooperation, trade, or cultural diplomacy. The confrontation 
continued in the military domain, as measures adopted by NATO to 
increase deterrence in the Baltic states offered reassurances to its Allies 
but were interpreted by Russia as a military build-up on its borders and a 
signal for a possible long-term standoff in Western-Russian relations. At 
the same time, the security of the Baltic region did not exist in a vacuum, 
and it was significantly influenced by the developments in the 
international arena. 
 
By way of conclusion 
 This overview of the development of the Baltic policy positions 
during the first years of the Ukraine crisis has highlighted several crucial 
elements in their national foreign policy. First of all, as an Eastern 
Partnership country, Ukraine already had been a priority for the Baltic 
states before the outbreak of the crisis in 2013. The Baltic states 
emphasized an ambitious EU approach towards the Eastern neighborhood 
and were guided by this principle also on the national level. As such, 
providing support and assistance to Ukraine to ensure a democratic 
transition was a major task for foreign policymaking on the national level 
after the regime change in 2014.  
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Secondly, and more importantly, the crisis in Ukraine was not only 
about Ukraine. For the Baltic states, it rapidly escalated the concerns about 
their own security, as Russian aggression highlighted several weak spots in 
the security environment and domestic political situation in several Central 
and Eastern European countries. As the article describes, there were several 
crucial differences between Ukraine and the Baltic states that did not allow 
the Ukrainian situation to be easily compared to the situation in the Baltic 
region; to many, the Crimea scenario was not seen as applicable to the 
Baltic states. However, the crisis did alarm Baltic decisionmakers and 
accentuate the weaknesses of the Baltic states, whether they be 
shortcomings in the integration of local Russian-speaking minorities, 
energy reliance on Russia, trade and business dependencies, or the need to 
invest more in defense. This, in turn, could be seen as a testament to the 
prudent choice of the Baltic states to focus on a comprehensive approach 
to security. 
Thirdly, implications of the Ukraine crisis were also interpreted at 
the regional and international level. The primary discourse in the Baltic 
states emphasized the collapse of the post-Cold War international security 
system as a result of Russian aggression. The vague situation wherein, 
despite this breach of international law, the territorial integrity of a 
sovereign country could not be restored, opened up a Pandora’s Box for 
similar ventures in the future. On the regional level, this spurred extended 
cooperation between Nordic and Baltic countries, with and without the 
NATO dimension. On the international level, this raised debate over NATO’s 
Article 5 and the collective defense clause in any NATO member-state 
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territory. Should NATO be unable to initiate Art. 5 in case of a military 
attack against one of its members, this would render the alliance defunct. 
This is relevant also in the context of debates around the development of 
EU defense capabilities. The relations between the EU and its Baltic 
member-states in light of the Ukraine crisis demonstrates the importance 
of the EU for the Baltic region. Despite the fact that the expectations of the 
three Baltic countries surpassed the deliverables of the EU, the former 
successfully managed to upload their foreign policy concerns to the EU 
level and extensively downloaded EU policies (EaP in particular) and 
positions towards the Eastern neighborhood to their national foreign 
policies. This relationship shows that, in the case of a key foreign policy 
issue, the EU dimension grew and became more important than simply 
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